Introduction
Let me start with a (too) simple description of the aims of science: the search and subsequent testing of stable patterns that can be used for explanation and prediction.
These stable patterns are usually called "laws of nature". But where do we find these patterns? Current philosophers of science, like Nancy Cartwright (1999) , believe that these patterns only occur where the circumstances are similar, that is in laboratories or in ceteris paribus environments.
If they were right, the possibility of science outside the laboratory would be problematic, particularly the possibility of a scientific economics. Haavelmo believed the "crazy" opposite, expressed by the above remarks to Cartwright. His remarks have to be seen in a longer discussion, started in the 19 th century, whether and in what sense economics can be considered as an "exact science". The pessimistic view is that economics can never be turned into an exact science; the optimistic view is that it eventually is possible.
This discussion "that there is, or may be, a science" of economics, started with John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic (1911, first published in 1843). Mill regarded economics as an "inexact science". The basic premises of economics state accurately how specific causal factors operate, but, according to Mill, they are statements of tendencies and are inexact rather than universal generalizations. Economists know the major causes of economic phenomena, but there are many "inferences" or "disturbing causes". In an exact science, explanation is complete: "the greater causes, those on which the principal part of the phenomenon depends, are within the reach of observation and measurement; so that if no other causes intervened, a complete explanation could be given not only of the phenomenon in general, but of all the variations and modifications which it admits of" (552). A science is exact when "its phenomena have been brought under laws comprehending the whole of the causes by which the phenomena are influenced, whether in a great or only in a trifling degree, whether in all or only in some cases, and assigning to each of those causes the share of effect which really belongs to it" (553). In opposition to this, in an inexact science the only laws as yet accurately ascertained are those of the causes which affects the phenomenon in all cases, and in considerable degree; while others which affect it in some cases only, or, if in all, only in a slight degree, have not been sufficiently ascertained and studied to enable us to lay down their laws, still less to deduced the completed laws of the phenomenon, by compounding the effects of the greater with those of the minor causes. (Mill 1911, 553) Mill refers to the science of tides as an example of an inexact science. Scientists know the laws of the great causes, the gravitational attraction of the sun and the moon, but they are ignorant of "circumstances of a local or casual nature, such as the configuration of the bottom of the ocean, the degree of confinement from shores, the direction of the wind, &c" (553).
Since economists, in Mill's view, know only the laws of the "greater causes" of the phenomena, they are unable to infer invariably and precisely what actually occurs.
Economic theory considers only some of the "great causes" of economic phenomena.
Economics is in this way an inexact science. This inability is a consequence of inexactness within the theory, not merely of faulty data or mathematical limitations.
About 40 years later, Alfred Marshall made the same comparison of economics with the science of tides, to discuss economics as an inexact science:
The laws of economics are to be compared with the laws of the tides, rather than with the simple and exact law of gravitation. For the actions of men are so various and uncertain, that the best statement of tendencies, which we can make in a science of human conduct, must needs be inexact and faulty. (Marshall 1930, 32) Marshall devoted chapter 3 (of Book I) of the Principles to a discussion of the nature of "economic generalizations or laws". Why, he asked, should the "laws of economics" be less predictable and precise in their workings than the law of gravitation? The key to Marshall's view lies in his claim that economic mechanisms work out their influences against a messy background of complicated factors, so that the most we can expect of economic analysis is that it captures the "tendencies"
induced by changes in this or that factor.
[N]o one knows enough about the weather to be able to say beforehand how it will act. A heavy downpour of rain in the upper Thames valley, or a strong north-east wind in the German Ocean, may make the tides at London Bridge differ a great deal from what had been expected. (Marshall 1930, 32) The discussion of precisely this central problem of the scientific endeavor of economics was recently revitalized by John Sutton (2000) in his Gaston Eyskens
Lecture with the telling title: "Marshall's Tendencies. What Can Economists Know?"
According to Sutton, "if the analogy of the tides were valid in economics, life would be much easier for economists" (5). The reason for this is that in the early 1950s, a successful program, "the standard paradigm of applied economics", was designed that worked perfectly for phenomena like tides. "If Marshall's analogy were valid, we would have seen spectacular progress in economic over the past fifty years" (5). The standard paradigm, Sutton is referring to, is no less than Haavelmo's program published in his article on The Probability Approach in Econometrics, published as a supplement to the July 1944 issue of Econometrica.
Sutton sees this "standard paradigm" (a science of the tides) as consisting of three properties:
(1) The true model captures a "complete" set of factors that exert large and systematic influences, (2) All remaining influences can be treated as a noise component that can be modeled as a draw from some probability distribution, and (3) The model determines a unique equilibrium. (Sutton 2000, 20) Although this paradigm, according to Sutton, works successfully for tide phenomena, it failed for economic phenomena: Suppose there is a true model linking an endogenous variable y to a vector x = (x 1 , …, x n ) of exogenous variables, in the sense that y i = a 1 x i,1 + a 2 x i,2 + … + a n x i,n +  i .
"I want to take away the sharp distinction between two different types of influence, which we had in the tides analogy, where the astronomical components played the role of the x i s and the meteorological components played the role of the noise component,  i " (p. 21). In practice, many of the xs may be difficult to measure, even by way of some proxy variable that we might use to control for their effects. "We are stuck with the fact that some of our systematic influences have slipped into our estimated 'residuals,' that is, into the noise component" (p. 21).
I believe that much of the difficulty economists have encountered over the past fifty years can be traced to the fact that the economic environments we seek to model are sometimes too messy to be fitted into the mold of a well-behaved, complete model of the standard kind. It is not generally the case that some sharp dividing line separates a set of important systematic influences that we can measure, proxy, or control for, from the many small unsystematic influences that we can bundle into a "noise" term. (Sutton 2000, 32) This article will argue that this "standard paradigm" was not Haavelmo's. Haavelmo knew the limitations of this standard program too well:
Certainly we know that decisions to consume, to invest, etc., depend on a great number of factors, many of which cannot be expressed in quantitative terms.
What is then the point of trying to associate such behavior with only a limited set of measurable phenomena, which cannot give more than an incomplete picture of the whole "environment" or "atmosphere" in which the economic planning and decisions take place? (Haavelmo 1944, 3) As an "apprentice" of Ragnar Frisch (Bjerkholt 2005 
However, if we do this for each individual, we shall find -no matter what be the fixed function f -that our "explanation" is incomplete. More specifically, we shall find that two individuals, or the same individual in two different time periods, may be confronted with exactly the same set of specified influencing factors x [and, hence, they have the same y*, by (11.1)], and still the two individuals may have different quantities y, neither of which may be equal to y*. We may try to remove such discrepancies by introducing more "explaining factors", x. But usually, we shall soon exhaust the number of factors which could be considered as common to all individuals, and which, at the same time,
were not merely of negligible influence upon y. The discrepancies y -y* for each individual may depend upon a great variety of factors, these factors may be different from one individual to another, and they may vary with time for each individual. (Haavelmo 1944, 51) Even the works of the other pioneers of econometrics, Jan Tinbergen and Tjalling Koopmans, the Dutch compeers of Frisch and Haavelmo, show much more sophistication than is assumed by the characterisation of the standard paradigm.
Linear Regression Analysis in the 1930s
The awareness summand of accidental nature', the notion of a complete set of determining variables is fixed by that standard" (6).
The statistician, however, cannot test the completeness of this set, "the possibility remains that the supposed complete set, though differing from the real one in at least one variable, figures in the regression equation as a representative of it, and is able to do so because of close interrelations, 'by chance' or otherwise conditioned, between variables of the two sets" (57). In order to decide what may occur "by chance", Koopmans saw that the statistician's task requires knowledge of the laws governing the behavior of the variables concerned. Though unable to confirm the validity of the economist's contribution, the statistician, however, may in some cases tell the economists to be wrong, namely in those cases in which a regression equation "expressing the dependent variable in terms of the determining variables of the supposed complete set, fitted to the data, leaves large residuals" (58). In the case of small residuals which do not exhibit systematic variation, the task of the statistician is confined to a study of the reliability of the empirical regression coefficients on the hypothesis that the economist indicated the right set of determining variables, or, at least, that he did not omit important determining variables from his list. Such a study is, indeed, possible. (Koopmans 1937, 58) The task of the statistician was modest, in the sense that it was restricted to an evaluation of the reliability of the regression coefficients and to tell the economist whether s/he has omitted a causal factor, but not what the omitted factor would be.
Haavelmo's Critique
Haavelmo, being acquainted with the latest developments in econometrics, was studying what it meant for a "determining variable" to be "important". In this periodlate 1930s and early 1940s -he was clearly investigating this issue, witnessed by three papers written in this period, which will be discussed here.
In a lecture given at the Third Nordic Meeting of Younger Economists, Copenhagen, May 1939 , Haavelmo (2008 discussed that if there is a "statistical agreement" between the observed data and the regression equation, it is still the question of whether the regression coefficients are "significant", that is whether the absolute value of the coefficients are large relative to their standard errors (14).
Haavelmo may have received this specific idea of "significance" when he visited
Tinbergen in Geneva, when Tinbergen was at the League of Nations, whose research led to the two-volume Statistical Testing, published in 1939. There is some evidence to assume that Tinbergen, in his turn, got this idea from Ragnar Frisch (Boumans 2010 ). There is however so far no evidence of a direct influence of this idea by Frisch on Haavelmo.
Tinbergen defined the term b 2 x 2 in an expression like y = b 2 x 2 + b 3 x 3 + …, as the "influence of x 2 ". The "strength of this influence" was defined as b 2  2 , that is the standard deviation of x 2 times the regression coefficient (Tinbergen 1939a, 22-23) .
To discuss whether this "strength of influence" could play a role to evaluate whether a causal factor is relevant, Haavelmo made a distinction between "error of the momentary explanation" and the "error of the average relation". He showed the difference between these two with the following example: Consider N observations on three variables, x, y and z, between which exists the following true but unknown relation (note that the three variables are measured from their respective means):
Suppose that we assume a relationship exists between y and x but we are ignorant about the influence of z:
The correlation coefficient between y and x is 
So, when the number of observations increases, the "error in the average explanation",  b will reduce, but the "error in the momentary explanation" remains at the same level This "error in the momentary explanation" was subsequently used to discuss the following cases: The smaller the variation in z,  z , and larger the correlation r xz , the better the "momentary explanation of y." A high correlation r xz means that the variation in x also accounts for part of the variation in z, so the omission of z is not that bad. The more interesting case, however, is the opposite case when both the correlation r xz and the variation of z,  z , are small:
This means that z is a superfluous variable when it comes to explaining the observed variation of y in this material. But that does not necessarily mean that
[the regression equation] will give a good forecast of y outside the period covered by the data. (Haavelmo 2008, 15) Equation (1) shows that if z varies strongly enough, it would exert a substantial influence. So, although x alone may give a good explanation of y for the used data set, "it may be of decisive importance whether or not we can utilize the tiny part of the variation remaining in attempting to capture the effect of z" (15-16).
This indeed shows how crucial it is to have, in advance, a formulation of the hypotheses, in which one operates with specific fictitious variations. If one refrains from doing so, one runs the risk of missing out important variables that, by change or for specific reasons, have not shown significant variation in the material at hand. And although a simpler hypothesis may give a stable average explanation and for that reason gets accepted as statistically valid, it may well give a very poor, maybe a completely worthless momentary explanation and no deeper insight into structural relationships between the studied variables. (Haavelmo 2008, 16) In other words, the "strength of the influence", that is regression coefficient times standard deviation, is not a good indicator for telling us whether a variable is deeper structural factor, because it depends too much on whether the variable has shown significant variation.
This same issue was also discussed in a more direct critique of Tinbergen's method employed in his work at the League of Nations. In a 1941 'note', Haavelmo criticizes
Tinbergen's method of using regression analysis to select the main causal factors, in particular Tinbergen's decision that the rate of interest does not a causally effect investment.
According to the "classic dynamic theories of production and prices" the interest rate is a "powerful; autonomous parameter" (49). But Tinbergen's (1939a) regression analysis shows that the regression coefficient of the interest rate is not significantly different from zero, and therefore Tinbergen concludes that "variations in the rate of interest play only a minor role, or no role at all, in the changes in investment activity" (49). Haavelmo's (1941b) 'Note', however, aims to show that the coefficient being zero "by itself is not sufficient to establish this conclusion" (49). Moreover, it aims to show that that regression equations "may be very misleading if the regression coefficients be taken to represent effects of autonomous changes in the corresponding variables" (49).
To better understand what Haavelmo's critique entails, it first should be noted that
Tinbergen did not only use the "influence" of a factor for evaluating whether a variable to be relevant but also the "strength of the influence" (Boumans 2010 ). In his "statistical testing", the strength of the interest rate shows this influence to be "far less important than profits and share yields" (Tinbergen 1939a, 55 ).
Haavelmo showed with a model representing the structural relationships with respect to investment activity that even if the interest rate is a "causal component", its regression coefficient can still be zero: Let y 1 , y 2 , …, y n be a number of causal components, where for this case y 1 is gross profit, y 2 is total interest expenses, etc. Let 
then the regression coefficient k 2 is zero. But also when m = a 3 y 4 , where y 4 is "some other effect of the interest on investment, which are not included in the calculation of net profit" (50), like substitution effect, different preference schedules for different kinds of holdings, etc., we still would have k 2 to be zero, because these effects are partly taken care of by net profit. This result, however, as Haavelmo emphasized, does not imply that changes in the interest rate has no influence upon investment, the interest rate "may indirectly exercise a decisive influence upon v, namely via its influence upon z" (50).
Beside the fact that the causal structure can be such that the regression coefficient of a causal component will always be zero, Haavelmo gave also a second reason for this result:
the rate of interest may not have varied much during the statistical testing period, and for this reason the rate of interest would not "explain" very much of the variation in net profit (and thereby the variation in investment) which has actually taken place during this period. But one cannot conclude that the rate of influence would be inefficient as an autonomous regulator, which is, after all, the important point. (Haavelmo 1941b, 50) .
This point was acknowledged by Tinbergen in the second volume of Statistical Testing:
It goes without saying that if some explanatory factor has not changed at all in the period studied, its influence cannot be determined. If it changed only slightly, its regression coefficient may be uncertain. Extrapolation of such results for large variations in the factors concerned is therefore not permitted. (Tinbergen 1939b, 13) Haavelmo's Epistemology This framework can be understood by first considering the following generalization of analysis of the Copenhagen lecture: Note again that the variables are measured from their respective means. Assume that the true relation between y and a set of independent causal factors (correlation coefficients between them are zero) is:
Assume that one of the variables, say x i does not deviate from its mean ( i = 0), that is, it remains constant for the considered data set. Then, the correlation of variable x i , r iy = a i  i / y = 0 and thus the regression equation is ŷ = a 1 x 1 + … + a i-1 x i-1 + a i+1 x i+1 + … + a n x n As a result, the "error of the momentary explanation" is:
In his later 1941 assessment of this result, Haavelmo saw that this "error" could be reinterpreted as a measure of the "factual influence" of the variable x i on y, which he defined as follows: Let y be a theoretical variable defined as a function of n independent causal variables x 1 , x 2 , …, x n :
Let us replace the variable x i by a constant c i so determined that    2   1  2  1  2  1   , , , , , -, , , , ,
is a minimum with respect to c i . The factual influence of the variable x i upon y is then defined as Constant
To see that the factual influence is indeed a generalization of the error in the momentary explanation, take the linear case: f(x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ) = a 1 x 1 + a 2 x 2 + … + a n x n .
Then c i = i x and thus
To arrive at a more general framework to discuss the relevance of causal factors,
Haavelmo defined the "potential influence" of a causal factor x i upon y as (23):
To compare the size of the potential influence of each of the variables x i , one has, for any point (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ), to choose a set of displacements x 1 , x 2 , …, x n , which are considered to be of "equal size according to some standard of judgment" (23).
This concept of potential influence can be clarified by using the definition of a partial derivative:
For a fixed set of displacements, say x i =  i , the potential influence can be rewritten as:
As we can infer from this expression, the potential influence is a feature of the function f, or as Haavelmo put it, "For a given system of displacements x 1 , x 2 , …, x n , the potential influences are clearly, formal properties of the function f" (23-24).
In the Copenhagen lecture Haavelmo made a few remarks that confirm my interpretation of potential influence in terms of partial derivatives. In a section on the ceteris paribus clause, he distinguishes between two types of ceteris paribus clauses.
The first is the usual type where in the selection of essential "elements" guided by theory and data, one imposes the ceteris paribus clause on all remaining unspecified elements "because to the total effect of these other elements has by experience played no large part for the problem at hand and neither can be expected to do so in the future, so that whether we assume them unchanged or let them play freely is virtually of no consequence" (Haavelmo 2008, 8 ). This will be discussed below. The second type, of more interest here, is the one we impose within the system of specified variables. The idea here is just the same as that of partial derivatives. We study relations between some among the specified objects, which are mutually independent, subject to the assumption that the remaining elements specified are kept constant. Usually, the form that such relations takes depends on the level at which the other elements are fixed. Such reasoning is not only of theoretical interest, on the contrary, it is also the basis for assessing effects of practical measures of intervention in the economic activity (Haavelmo 2008, 8) This latter aspect of assessing the effects of interventions with partial derivatives will be discussed below.
Using this expression, we can now also rewrite the expression for the factual influence as:
In other words, the factual influence consists of two components: potential influence and variation. The first component is only knowledgeable due to the second component.
With these two concepts Haavelmo could now better clarify the limits of statistical inferences. In economics, the investigator is "a passive observer", which means that "He is not in a position to enforce the prescriptions of his own designs of ideal experiments" (7). The problem then is that with respect to finding and verifying laws: (1) experiments that we should like to make to see if certain real economic phenomena -when artificially isolated from "other influences" -would verify certain hypotheses, and (2) the stream of experiments that Nature is steadily turning from her own enormous laboratory, and which we merely watch as passive observers. (Haavelmo 1944, 14) In case of the first class of experiments to isolate a selected set of factors, x 1 , …, x n , from the other influences, x n+1 , x n+2 , …, we first impose ceteris paribus conditions on the latter set -x n+1 = x n+2 = … = 0 -so that a simpler relationship can be investigated:
In such a controlled experiment, the remaining factors, x i , can be varied in a systematic way to gain knowledge about the f/x i 's and so to see whether they are stable for these variations. If this applies for all factors x 1 , …, x n , we have found a lawful relation between y and these factors.
In the second class of experiments, we usually passively observe a limited number of factors that have a nonnegligible factual influence (
Thus, the relationship y = f(x 1 , …, x n ) explains the actual observed values of y, provided that the other factual influences of all the unspecified factors are negligible.
The problem with passive observations, however, is that it is not possible to identify the reason for the factual influence of a factor, say x n+1 , being negligible,
. We cannot distinguish whether its potential influence is very smal
, or whether the factual variation of this factor in the data set period under consideration was too small,
. We would like only to omit the factors whose influence was not observed because their potential influence was negligible to star with. At the same time, we want to retain factors whose influence was not observed because they varied so less that their potential influence was veiled, but may "expl apparent 'breaks in structure' late t ain r" (26).
To know whether a certain factor is a potential influence, and therefore be taken account of, we are dependent on Nature's experiments. Regression analysis is based on Nature's variations and therefore does not give knowledge about whether a set of theoretically suggested causal factors is complete.
This problem of passive observation can be tackled in two ways. One is the accumulation of data sets with the aim that an increasing number of potential influences become visible; the other is to take account of as many as causal factors as theories suggest.
Frequently, our greatest difficulty in economic research does not lie in establishing simple relations between actual observation series, but rather in the fact that the observable relations, over certain time intervals, appear to be still simpler than we expect them to be from theory, so that we are thereby led to throw away elements of a theory that would be sufficient to explain apparent "breaks in structure" later. (Haavelmo 1944, 26) How can this framework help us to "establish constant laws of economic life" (17),
where one has to deal with "ever-shifting environments" (17)? Haavelmo's framework shows that beside ceteris paribus environments, laws can also exist in ceteris neglectis environments. These are environments were all kind of background influences are constantly changing, but that does not affect the "permanence" of a law because these background potential influences are all negligible, f/x n+1  f/x n+2  …  0.
Conclusions
In the preface of both the 1941 and 1944 versions of the Probability Approach,
Haavelmo thanks among others Edwin B. Wilson "for reading parts of the original manuscript, and for criticisms which have been utilized in the present formulations" (Haavelmo 1944, vi) . The utilizations of Wilson's criticism seem, however, not have gone far enough. In a review of this work, Wilson remains critical, particular about the first two chapters:
The work is difficult reading … the author's approach is extremely abstract and metaphysical; [the first two chapters] seems to be written quite as much from the point of view of the philosophy of scientific method in general as from that of economic analysis in particular. (Wilson 1946, 173) Ignoring the negative tone of this review, I fully agree with it. Having studied Haavelmo's first two chapters, they appear to provide a very rich epistemological framework for understanding what it entails to do scientific research outside the laboratory.
Like Sutton, Haavelmo did not believe that economics could be turned into an exact science.
From experience we know that attempts to establish exact functional relationships between observable economic variables would be futile. It would indeed be strange if it were otherwise, since economists would then find themselves in a more favorable position than any other research workers, including the astronomers. Actual observations, in whatever field we consider, will deviate more or less from any exact functional relationship we might try to establish. (Haavelmo 1944, 40) But this does not imply that we should give up our "hope to find elements of invariance in economic life, upon which to establish permanent 'laws'" (13).
Haavelmo's framework "may give us some hint as to how optimistic or pessimistic we have reason to be: we can try to indicate what would have to be the actual situation in order that there should be no hope of establishing simple and stable causal relations" (23). It shows that for the existence of laws we do not need to have the hard requirement of ceteris paribus environments, but we can do with the softer requirement of a ceteris neglectis environment.
This does not deny the other part of the problem of finding laws outside the laboratory, namely the gain knowledge about potential influences, which ones are relevant and stable. Theories can help, "it is a task of making fruitful hypotheses as to how reality actually is" (31), the accumulation of data sets may also help (see also Sutton 2000, 21) . Nevertheless, It is a creative process, an art, operating with rationalized notions of some real phenomena and of the mechanism by which they are produced. The whole idea of such models rests upon a belief, already backed by a vast amount of experience in many fields, in the existence of certain elements of invariance in a relation between real phenomena, provided we succeed in bridging together the right ones. (Haavelmo 1944, 10) An alternative way, suggested by Ragnar Frisch, is to employ the "interview method", that is asking economic agents what they would do if such and such would happen (20) . And actually this method is employed today and which bring us back into the laboratory. For phenomena that cannot be reduced to individual decision making we will have to rely on expert knowledge, that is, "a matter of intuition and factual knowledge" (29)
